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OF LAW AND LEGACIES
Eric Berger
ABSTRACT
This contribution to the symposium on President Obama’s
constitutional legacy examines the relationship between constitutional law and
presidential legacies. Americans respect or even revere many presidents
despite their apparent constitutional violations. Some unconstitutional
actions, though, appear more forgivable than others. The effect constitutional
transgressions may have on a president’s more general legacy turns on a
variety of contextual factors, including, among others, the president’s values
and vision, the administration’s political successes and failures, political
opponents’ principles and behavior, the challenges confronting the country,
and the nature of the constitutional norms at issue. Constitutional law, as
articulated by lawyers and judges, is not irrelevant to presidential legacies, but
it rarely defines them.
While some of President Obama’s unilateral executive actions raised
serious constitutional questions, it is unlikely his legacy will turn on those
measures’ legality. In most cases, President Obama followed past presidential
practices and offered colorable (though admittedly contestable) legal defenses.
Moreover, context helps explain, if not completely justify, many of Obama’s
controversial actions. To this extent, historians and members of the general
public are likely to view the Obama presidency through a broader, nonlegal
lens, considering, inter alia, the challenges he inherited, the policies he helped
implement, and, especially, the vitriolic opposition he faced in Congress.
Indeed, the lead constitutional story from the Obama years will likely
highlight not particular executive actions but rather our constitutional system’s
deficiencies more generally. U.S. politics became increasingly dysfunctional
during Obama’s presidency, and they have not improved since. Dysfunctional
politics, of course, ought not immunize executive actions from legal attack.
 Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty, University of Nebraska
College of Law. Thanks to Anne Duncan, Jeff Duncan, Matt Schaefer, Miguel Schor,
Steve Willborn, and the participants in the 2017 Drake Constitutional Law Symposium,
the University of Nebraska College of Law Workshop Series, and the University of
Wisconsin Discussion Group on Constitutionalism for very helpful thoughts in
conversation and on early drafts. I am also grateful to Professor Mark Kende and the
editors of the Drake Law Review for organizing the symposium on President Obama’s
Constitutional Legacy. Finally, I thank Dillon Malone and his fellow editors for
meticulous editorial assistance and Sarah Burghaus for very capable research assistance.
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However, the depth of this dysfunction should encourage lawyers to broaden
their focus beyond narrow questions of legality in individual cases to more
fundamental concerns about the health of our constitutional democracy.
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“‘Tis easy to forgive those you like.” — Irish proverb

I. INTRODUCTION
In assessing the constitutional legacy of President Barack Obama, or
any president, we should clarify the nature of the inquiry. I therefore begin
with a question: Might there sometimes be a meaningful distinction between
a legalist inquiry and a historical one? In other words, might the court of
history sometimes assess a president’s legacy differently than a court of law
would?
The legalist inquiry asks whether judges and lawyers would find that
president’s actions constitutional under current doctrine. The historical
inquiry is necessarily broader and more multifaceted. It is less concerned
with legal technicalities and considers presidential actions in light of a variety
of contextual factors.
To borrow from Isaiah Berlin, under this framework, the legalist is a
hedgehog, focusing single-mindedly on the legality of the president’s
actions.1 The historian is a fox, approaching presidents from a variety of
perspectives.2 To be sure, these conceptions of the lawyer and historian are
artificial and oversimplified,3 but the dichotomy helps highlight the extent to
which lawyers focus on different questions than others. Both the legalist and
historical inquiries are valuable, but they have different concerns.
Though the legal and historical analyses are distinct, they also can
inform each other in important ways. The diligent historian will want to
know whether a president violated established legal doctrine. The careful
judge, for her part, will account for history and context in her written
opinion.
That said, accumulated history is generally not considered the ultimate
touchstone for constitutional meaning in the United States, as it is for the
1. See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S
VIEW OF HISTORY 1 (Henry Hardy & Aileen Kelly eds., 1966) (distinguishing between
two types of intellectuals: hedgehogs, “who relate everything to a single central vision,”
and foxes, “who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even contradictory”).
2. See id.
3. Historians are not the only ones who view events with a broader lens than
lawyers judging the legality of particular action. To this extent, my “historian” is a
construct encompassing not only academic historians but broader members of the
informed public trying to assess events and figures through a generalist lens. See Gordon
S. Wood, History and Myth, in THE PURPOSE OF THE PAST 249, 262 (2008).
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British constitution.4 In some cases, the historian’s ultimate assessment—
and, indeed, society’s appraisal—of a president’s legacy will seem out of step
with the lawyer’s. Indeed, oftentimes we assess a president’s general legacy
with minimal attention to constitutional issues, at least as those issues might
be analyzed by lawyers and judges in actual litigation.5 Put more bluntly,
sometimes we celebrate presidents who broke the law.
For someone who used to teach constitutional law, President Obama’s
constitutional legacy includes some potentially serious blemishes,
particularly involving his aggressive use of the executive power. He initiated
wars in Libya and against ISIS without express congressional authorization.6
He authorized numerous deadly drone strikes, including some on U.S.
citizens (most famously Anwar al-Awlaki), arguably in violation of
international and domestic law.7 On the domestic front, President Obama
aggressively used his office and the administrative state to create new
policies in several areas such as immigration, climate change, health care,
gun control, overtime rules, and minimum wage.8
I call these “potential” blemishes because there are colorable legal
arguments to be made in support of each of these actions.9 Let us assume for
the sake of argument, however, that some of these actions pushed
constitutional boundaries, at best, and would be deemed illegal by a majority
4. See Miguel Schor, The Other Path of Constitutionalism, 50 TULSA L. REV. 469,
471 (2015) (noting that the principles of the Constitution of the United Kingdom are
largely derived from the “best” practices of the British government).
5. Cf. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 26 (2007) (“Constitutional maintenance is above all a
political task. As such, it must be considered in political terms.”).
6. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, An Army Captain Takes Obama to Court Over ISIS
Fight, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/us/islamic-statewar-powers-lawsuit-obama.html; Linton Weeks, If This Is Not ‘War’ Against Libya,
What Is It?, NPR (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.NPR.org/2011/03/22/1347
62513/If-this-is-not-war-against-libya-what-is-it.
7. See, e.g., Scott Shane, The Lessons of Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug.
27,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/magazine/the-lessons-of-anwar-alawlaki.html.
8. See, e.g., Rebecca Shabad, Obama’s Key Executive Actions, HILL (July 6, 2014),
http://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/211303-obamas-key-executive-actions.
9. In a short symposium contribution about a large topic, I must paint with a broad
brush. This overview, therefore, does not purport to offer a thorough legal or political
analysis of the various issues discussed, or a comprehensive discussion of all the
constitutional issues to arise during the Obama presidency.
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of fair-minded judges, at worst. My question here is whether history might
forgive President Obama’s constitutional transgressions. In other words,
might the court of history care less about constitutional rules than many
lawyers would care to admit?
II. THE SPECTRUM OF PRESIDENTIAL LEGACIES
President Obama left office little over half a year ago, so it is too early
to assess definitively his legacy, constitutional or otherwise. We can,
however, look to past presidents to see if their legacies inform the
relationship between the historical and legalist analyses. The obvious
example is President Abraham Lincoln. Historians usually rate Lincoln as
one of our nation’s greatest presidents.10 In our popular national mythology,
too, Lincoln may be our greatest hero.
Constitutional scholars, however, often point out that President
Lincoln took several constitutionally suspect actions.11 He suspended habeas
corpus, despite the fact that the Constitution appears to give the suspension
power to Congress alone.12 He erected a naval blockade of the Confederacy,
despite the fact that his legal justification for the blockade was in tension
with his constitutional theory justifying the war to hold the Union together.13
He instituted the first national conscription under the Militia Act, an act that
one eminent commentator deemed “presidential legislation.”14 He
permitted military tribunals to hear cases against civilians, even sometimes
in northern states that had not seceded and where the courts remained
10. For example, a Wikipedia entry aggregates the results of various surveys of
historians and political scientists, and lists President Lincoln as the top-ranked president.
See Historical Rankings of Presidents of the United States, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Historical_rankings_of_presidents_of_the_United_States
(last visited Aug. 23, 2017). Whether there is any merit to these kinds of rankings is, of
course, a different question, but for my purposes, the important point is that President
Lincoln is generally regarded very highly.
11. See, e.g., JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN
513 (rev. ed. 1964) (“It is indeed a striking fact that Lincoln, who stands forth in popular
conception as a great democrat, the exponent of liberty and of government by the
people, was driven by circumstances to the use of more arbitrary power than perhaps
any other President has seized.”).
12. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (D. Md. 1861).
13. See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 641–42 (1862); Thomas H. Lee & Michael D.
Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive Action and Judicial Review in Wartime,
in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 53, 58, 66 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A.
Bradley, eds., 2009).
14. See RANDALL, supra note 11, at 239–74, 514.
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open.15 He issued the Emancipation Proclamation, a noble and righteous
action, no doubt, but also one that at the time raised thorny constitutional
questions.16
And yet, despite the fact that Lincoln pushed the Constitution to or
beyond its limits on numerous occasions, he is regarded as one of the
country’s finest presidents—and for good reason. Lincoln is the president
credited with freeing the slaves, with saving the Union, and with leading the
country successfully through its most traumatic episode. Lincoln’s
constitutional infidelities—if they were that—were usually in service of
noble goals.17
Perhaps we should not be surprised that the country does not hold
Lincoln’s constitutional infidelities against him. Historians, and arguably
lawyers, are more willing to forgive constitutional excesses in times of crisis.18
The Constitution might or might not build in implicit exceptions that would
vindicate Lincoln’s actions under a legalist analysis,19 but the historical
analysis surely permits careful consideration of such contextual factors. If
any period in our history entitled the President to claim a constitutional
“exception,”20 surely it was the Civil War.
Lincoln’s legacy also benefits from the fact that his opponents—
primarily the seceding Confederates—are understood today to have violated
the Constitution and basic human rights more than Lincoln did.21 Secession
is the constitutional sin that overshadows whatever transgressions Lincoln
might have authorized in response.22 And though the Constitution of 1787

15. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 29–30 (1866); DANIEL A. FARBER, LINCOLN’S
CONSTITUTION 163–65 (2003).
16. See FARBER, supra note 15, at 156–57; Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Lincoln, the
Emancipation Proclamation, and Executive Power, 73 MD. L. REV. 100, 100–11 (2013).
17. See FARBER, supra note 15, at 196.
18. Cf. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A
TIME OF WAR 224–55 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution still applies in times of war
but speaks “with a somewhat different voice”).
19. See id.; ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 11–12 (2010).
20. See generally GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1–4 (2005) (exploring
the “no-man’s-land between public law and political fact” and the “state of exception”
which constitutes “law’s threshold”).
21. See FARBER, supra note 15, at 144–46.
22. See id. at 196.
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clearly protected it,23 slavery was such an evil that today we understand the
Union to be righteous and the Confederacy depraved.24 Additionally,
Lincoln’s immediate predecessor, James Buchanan, and successor, Andrew
Johnson, manifestly lacked Lincoln’s moral vision, political skill, and
nuanced constitutional understanding.25 Heroes need foils, and Lincoln had
foils aplenty.
Moreover, Lincoln took the Constitution seriously. He rarely acted
without serious deliberation, and he carefully weighed the constitutional
arguments for and against most of his actions.26 As Professor Farber argues,
Lincoln was extraordinary because he saw the need to take dramatic action
to save the Union, while simultaneously maintaining a sense of perspective
about proper measures and their human and legal costs.27
Indeed, to the extent he realized he was sometimes on constitutional
thin ice, President Lincoln also took care to ensure that his measures were
no broader than necessary. For example, when he first suspended habeas
corpus, he did so only on the supply line between Philadelphia and
Washington, D.C., to protect Union troops who had been attacked while
switching trains in Baltimore.28 If he faced a temptation to suspend habeas
more broadly then, Lincoln resisted it.
Even so, it is worth emphasizing that Lincoln’s favorable legacy
depends a good deal on circumstance. We are willing to forgive Lincoln’s
constitutional record in large part because we deem him a great president.
Had the war turned out differently, we likely would see Lincoln and his
actions differently. Indeed, had the election of 1864 occurred a few months
earlier (before some important Union battlefield victories), Lincoln may

23. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (three-fifths clause); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1
(protecting slave trade until 1808); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 (fugitive slave clause).
24. See, e.g., Confederate Monuments Are Coming Down Across the United States.
Here’s a List., N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/16/us/
confederate-monuments-removed.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2017) (exemplifying the
general modern attitude toward the Confederacy).
25. See, e.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, 177 (1989) [hereinafter FONER, RECONSTRUCTION] (noting
that as president, Johnson found himself “thrust into a role that required tact, flexibility,
and sensitivity to the nuances of public opinion–qualities Lincoln possessed in
abundance, but that Johnson lacked”).
26. See FARBER, supra note 15, at 198–99.
27. See id. at 199.
28. See id. at 158; BRIAN MCGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 70–71, 79 (2008).
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well have lost, and his legacy would have been very different.29
On the other end of the spectrum is President Richard Nixon, who lost
his legal battle in the court of law30 and continues to lose in the court of
history. The defining events of the Nixon presidency—Watergate and the
subsequent cover-up—were egregious legal violations. For many
Americans, Nixon epitomizes the corrupt, lawless president.31
The differences between Lincoln and Nixon are obvious and
numerous. Nixon unquestionably broke the law; the Supreme Court, indeed,
unanimously rejected his constitutional argument to quash the subpoena for
the tapes.32 Though subsequent commentators have criticized the Court’s
reasoning, most agree that the result was correct.33 By contrast, reasonable
people disagree about whether some of Lincoln’s controversial actions did
in fact violate the Constitution.34
Even if we assume, however, that Lincoln did break the law, his
violations look very different from Nixon’s. If Lincoln violated the
Constitution, he did so for the noble causes of saving the Union and
(eventually) freeing the slaves.35 Lincoln also guided the country through the
greatest calamity in its history, and he was well aware that the Founders’
constitutional experiment would likely perish if the Union did not win the
war.36 As he asked when he initially suspended habeas corpus, “[A]re all the
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest
29. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA
770–71 (1988).
30. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714–16 (1974).
31. See Julian Zelizer, Distrustful Americans Still Live in Age of Watergate, CNN
(July 7, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/07/opinion/zelizer-watergate-politics/
index.html.
32. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 685–86 (1974) (Justice Rehnquist took no part).
33. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Nixon’s Shadow, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1405, 1405
(1999).
34. Professor Farber, for instance, points out that many of Lincoln’s controversial
actions were consistent with Congress’s intentions. See FARBER, supra note 15, at 132–
38.
35. Id. at 196–200. Though Lincoln genuinely loathed slavery, his public stances
towards the institution changed both before and during his presidency. See generally
ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY (2010)
[hereinafter FONER, FIERY TRIAL] (tracing President Lincoln’s ideas and policies on
slavery).
36. See Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (transcript available
at the U.S. National Archives & Records Administration).
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that one be violated?”37
Nixon’s constitutional theory, by comparison, was purely self-serving.
The break-in at the Democratic National Committee Watergate
headquarters and the subsequent cover-up served only Nixon’s political
interests.38 Moreover, Nixon’s constitutional argument that “separation of
powers doctrine precludes judicial review of a President’s claim of privilege”
conveniently would have protected Nixon from disclosing incriminating
information.39 The country, of course, did face serious problems, but Nixon’s
bogus assertion of executive privilege was not directed at solving them.40 The
court of history is more willing to forgive abuses committed toward national,
rather than selfish, ends. Of course, it is often debatable which ends are
selfish, but in the cases of Lincoln and Nixon, the answers are mostly
uncontroversial.
The presidents’ personal characteristics also distinguish them.
Americans admire Lincoln in part because of his qualities as a man: his
empathy, his intellectual rigor, his folksy humor, and his “capacity for
growth.”41 Nixon, though highly competent, possessed few endearing
qualities, deficiencies that likely contribute to his unfortunate legacy.42
The quick contrast between Lincoln and Nixon serves to demonstrate
that context, including nonlegal factors, matters.43 Some legalists may give
both Lincoln and Nixon low scores for their constitutional legacy, but most
historians will rate Lincoln highly and Nixon poorly.44 Phrased somewhat
37. MCGINTY, supra note 28, at 81 (alteration in original) (quoting Abraham
Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session Message (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 403 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953–1955)).
38. See Christopher H. Schroeder, The Story of United States v. Nixon: The
President and the Tapes, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 343 (Christopher H.
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
39. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
40. See Schroeder, supra note 38, at 329–30, 343.
41. FONER, FIERY TRIAL, supra note 35, at xix.
42. See 40 Years After Watergate, A Look Back at Nixon’s Downfall, NPR (May 21,
2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/21/314596874/40-years-after-watergate-a-look-backat-nixon-s-downfall.
43. Needless to say, a symposium contribution cannot examine the many other
presidents whose legacies fall elsewhere on the spectrum. For a fascinating study
examining several presidencies, see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS
PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993).
44. See, e.g., Presidential Historians Survey 2017, C-SPAN, https://www.cspan.org/presidentsurvey2017/?page=overall (last visited Sept. 9, 2017).
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differently, a president’s general legacy will often matter much more than
his constitutional legacy. Constitutional transgressions matter, but perhaps
more so when they reinforce an unfavorable legacy more generally. Nixon’s
conception of near-absolute executive privilege has defined his legacy
because it fits the broader Watergate narrative of “Nixon the crook.”45
Nixon—the man and the President—was obviously more complicated, and
his presidency included some important successes that helped the country.46
Nevertheless, President Nixon’s legacy, constitutional and otherwise, is
shaped by the Watergate scandal and his response to it.
Lincoln’s legacy, by contrast, transcends his constitutionally
questionable decisions. Interestingly, this is probably not because we now
accept Lincoln’s constitutional arguments.47 To the contrary, lawyers usually
do not assume today that Lincoln’s example necessarily vindicates similar
subsequent presidential actions.48 Rather, when we assess Lincoln’s legacy
generally, we forgive his constitutional excesses.
This is an obvious point, but it can be lost on lawyers, who sometimes
think of legal questions as binary—that is, of actions as either legal or
illegal.49 Judges, after all, must decide how to rule in each case. Historical
analysis is inherently more open ended. The historian, whether professional
or lay, can identify unconstitutional actions, but unlike the judge, such a
finding need not conclude the analysis. The historian can search for
explanations, examine tensions, and highlight paradoxes.50 The historian can
also take account of subsequent generations’ moral attitudes. Whereas the
judge must focus (or, at a minimum, appear to focus) on legal analyses, the
45. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 33, at 1405–07.
46. See, e.g., Joan Hoff, Nixon Had Some Successes, Before His Disgrace, N.Y.

TIMES (June 13, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/06/13/did-anygood-come-of-watergate/nixon-had-some-successes-before-his-disgrace.
47. See Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the
Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?: Do We/Should We Care What the Answer
Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1148–50 (2001) [hereinafter Levinson, Was the
Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?].
48. See FARBER, supra note 15, at 197.
49. See Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 861–62 (1992).
50. See, e.g., Eric Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 329,
367–68 (2013); Jack N. Rakove, Confessions of an Ambivalent Originalist, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1346, 1347 (2003) (“Unlike lawyers, we [historians] are not trained to speak with
the voice of the advocate or the adversary. . . . The nuance, subtlety, and respect for
ambiguity that we [historians] cherish and relish in our research cannot easily be
translated into urgent political discussion.”).
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historian, like society more generally, can engage with the president’s values
and vision, as well as his ability “to advance his agenda and to maintain his
political coalition.”51 To this extent, the historian is likely to go beyond
judge-made constitutional doctrine and examine the complex web of
institutional, ideological, legal, and partisan commitments that
simultaneously empower and constrain the president.52 Of course, historians
exploring these issues do not often consciously seek to define the legacy of
public figures, but their projects contribute to those legacies. Those projects
usually consider much more than whether a public actor followed the letter
of the law.
III. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S LEGACY: SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
How, then, will history judge President Obama’s legacy in light of these
broader factors? It is fair to say that Barack Obama was neither a Lincoln
nor a Nixon. Though I greatly admire him, I do not think President Obama
will be remembered as one of the country’s greatest presidents. I am also
confident he will not be remembered as one of the worst. Even critics who
disliked the Obama presidency must concede that he was no crook.53 Like
most presidents, Obama’s legacy will be mixed.
Of course, it is difficult to assess a president’s legacy without reference

51. WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 18; see also Levinson, Was the Emancipation
Proclamation Constitutional?, supra note 47, at 1150 (“When all is said and done, we
place far greater emphasis on whether we substantively like the outcomes, than on their
legal pedigree.”).
52. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 22.
53. Though “scandals” are often in the eye of the beholder, the Obama White
House, unlike many recent presidents, lacked a major scandal. See Glenn Kessler, Has
the Obama White House Been ‘Historically Free of Scandal’?, WASH. POST (Jan. 19,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/01/19/has-theobama-white-house-been-historically-free-of-scandal/?utm_term=.db4a81ca55db.
Political opponents complained about the IRS’s alleged targeting of conservative
political groups seeking tax-exempt status. This narrative, if true, would point to an
appalling abuse of power (though one not necessarily linked directly to the President).
In all events, recent findings by the Department of the Treasury’s Inspector General
indicate that the IRS similarly scrutinized organizations associated with liberal causes
and likely put the political firestorm to rest. See Alan Rappeport, In Targeting Political
Groups, I.R.S. Crossed Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/politics/irs-targeting-tea-party-liberalsdemocrats.html?_r=0.
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to one’s own normative biases.54 Indeed, the historical inquiry, like the
legalist inquiry, is value laden. Historians, both lay and professional, will
disagree with each other, just as judges do.
With that major caveat, I think President Obama’s general legacy will
be much more positive than negative. Obama inherited very difficult
situations and in many respects left the country much better than it was when
he took office.55 Perhaps most notably, he came to office during the country’s
greatest economic crisis in 70 years, and his policies helped avert economic
catastrophe.56 While no president deserves too much credit (or blame) for
the economy, the unemployment rate, which had peaked at 10 percent early
in the Obama presidency, was down to 4.7 percent by the time he left office.57
As one commentator put it, “If other policy decisions had been made, things
could have been very different, and much worse.”58
Obama also changed the national debate on important issues,
especially health care. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) is undoubtedly a
flawed statute, but it cut the number of uninsured Americans nearly in half.59
Not everybody thinks this is a good thing, but the law has changed the debate
surrounding health insurance.60 As a result, even Republicans who loathe
the ACA have not been able to agree on a replacement.61 Were it not for
President Obama, the fate of 20 million people’s health insurance likely
would not have had enough political salience to fracture the Republican

54. To that extent, I fully admit that my own views have partially shaped my analysis
here, though I have also tried to be fair-minded.
55. See John Cassidy, Obama’s Economic Record: An Assessment, NEW YORKER,
(Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/obamas-economic-recordan-assessment.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. Id.
59. See Louise Radnofsky, Percentage of Uninsured Historically Low, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/percentage-of-uninsured-historically-low1473220802.
60. See Gary Westphalen & Serena Marshall, The Obama Legacy: A Promise of
Hope, ABC NEWS, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/deepdive/obama-legacy-promisehope-44597110 (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
61. See Robert Y. Shapiro & Greg M. Shaw, Why Can’t the Senate Repeal
Obamacare? Because Its Policies Are Actually Popular, WASH. POST (July 19, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/19/why-cant-thesenate-repeal-obamacare-because-its-actual-policies-arepopular/?utm_term=.432fa31202e4.
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Party as it has in 2017.62 It is too early to assess the long-term policy
implications of these developments, but the effect on the national debate has
been significant.
President Obama also served in profoundly divisive times63 and carried
himself with unfailing dignity and grace. Compared to many colleagues from
both parties in Congress, President Obama often seemed like the only
grownup in the room.64 In an era of intense political vitriol, President Obama
modeled respectful, thoughtful discourse.65
President Obama’s political opponents undoubtedly contest these
characterizations. Some also hasten to enumerate his unconstitutional
actions.66 Such rhetoric may be politically effective, but it fails to wrestle with
the issues’ legal complexities. This is not to say that all these lists’ conclusions
are necessarily wrong, but rather that in many cases there are reasonable
(and complicated) arguments to be made on each side.67
More to the point, even assuming arguendo that President Obama
violated the Constitution on some occasions, that conclusion on its own tells
us little about the Obama legacy more generally. When Americans look back
on a president’s constitutional decisions, they do not do so in a vacuum. We
should, of course, ask how lawyers would analyze particular actions, but we
should also recognize that the legalist analysis is often but a splotch on the
historian’s wider canvas.

62. See id.
63. See Michael Dimock, How America Changed During Barack Obama’s

Presidency, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/2017/01/
10/how-america-changed-during-barack-obamas-presidency/.
64. See, e.g., Rep. Wilson Shouts, ‘You Lie’ to Obama During Speech, CNN POL.
(Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/09/joe.wilson/.
65. See The Times Editorial Board, Farewell to Barack Obama: A Humane,
Intelligent, and (Mostly) Effective Leader, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-obama-appraisal-20170114-story.html.
66. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, President Obama’s Top 10 Constitutional Violations of
2013, FORBES (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/
12/23/president-obamas-top-10-constitutional-violations-of-2013/#5ea526bb7667; Ilya
Shapiro, Top 10 Ways Obama Violated The Constitution During His Presidency,
FEDERALIST (Jan. 19, 2017), http://thefederalist.com/2017/01/19/10-ways-obamaviolated-constitution-presidency/.
67. Cf. Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 667, 671–78 (2015) [hereinafter, Berger, Rhetoric] (lamenting the certainty of tone
that pervades much rhetoric about the Constitution).
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A. Foreign Affairs
With those more general (and admittedly contestable) observations in
mind, how would the legalist evaluate President Obama’s constitutional
legacy? On the foreign affairs front, Obama authorized repeated drone
strikes—including against U.S. citizens—in places like Yemen and Somalia.
He also ordered the assassination of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan68 and
initiated military action, without express congressional authorization,
against Moammar Qaddafi in Libya and against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.69
There certainly are legal arguments to be made against these actions.
Commentators disagree about what circumstances beyond self-defense, if
any, permit the president to authorize force abroad without congressional
authorization.70 However, even if we infer from our history that the president
sometimes has authority to take military action without congressional
authorization,71 it is far from clear that the circumstances here necessitated
unilateral executive action.72 Qaddafi was a brutal dictator, but he posed a
minimal threat to the United States.73
Similarly, while ISIS is unquestionably dangerous, it is less clear how
much of a direct threat it poses to the United States’ national security.74 Most
of its atrocities during the Obama years were committed in Syria and Iraq,

68. Razzan Nakhlawi, The Kill List: Islamic State Leaders Taken off the Battlefield,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-targetedkillings-drone-snap-htmlstory.html.
69. In light of justiciability doctrines like standing and the political question
doctrine, judges might not tackle such issues often, even if the president does act
unconstitutionally. However, lawyers advising the president on such action, such as those
in the Office of Legal Counsel, can draw legal lines, as can the legal academy.
70. See, e.g., Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115
YALE L. J. 2512, 2514–15 (2006) (summarizing different scholarly views).
71. See Lori Fisher Damrosch, Comment, War and Uncertainty, 114 YALE L.J. 1405,
1408 (2005) (“Only nine times has Congress acted with bright-line clarity to authorize
initiation of major combat.”).
72. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, Syria Insta-Symposium: The President’s Wise
Decision, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 1, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/01/presidents-wisedecision/.
73. See Stephen Zunes, Libya, the United States, and the Anti-Gaddafi Revolt,
HUFFPOST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/stephenzunes/libya-the-united-states-a_b_
828199.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
74. See Massimo Calabresi, Understanding the ISIS Threat to Americans at Home,
TIME (Sept. 9, 2014), http://time.com/3313613/isis-barack-obama-terrorism-threat/.
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or in Europe.75 Indeed, some critics have argued that U.S. intervention
against ISIS in Syria and Iraq may increase the risk to our country by
inspiring future attacks.76 Even were this projection inaccurate, it is hard to
see how military action in the Middle East helps protect the country against
ISIS-inspired attacks in the United States, such as the terrible shooting in
Orlando, which was committed by a radicalized U.S.-born citizen.77
Additionally, the Obama Administration’s claim that Congress’s 2001
Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) authorized its war
against ISIS strained credulity.78 The AUMF was an immediate response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and targeted al Qaeda and the
Taliban.79 Though ISIS, like al Qaeda, is an extremist Sunni terrorist

75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Peter Beinart, Why Attacking ISIS Won’t Make Americans Safer,

ATLANTIC (Mar. 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/03/whyattacking-isis-wont-make-americans-safer/426861/ (stating that sending more U.S.
troops to Iraq and Syria would likely spark more terrorism against the United States, at
least in the short term); David Coates, Weighing the Arguments on U.S. Military Action
Against ISIS, HUFFPOST (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/davidcoates/weighing-the-arguments-on_b_6830606.html; Richard Lebaron, Should We Go to
War Against ISIS?, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/should-wego-war-against-isis-395653 (indicating increasing U.S. effort might increase the risk in
the United States where ISIS has not been a significant threat).
77. See Ralph Ellis et al., Orlando Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooter Pledged ISIS
Allegiance, CNN (June 13, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclubshooting/.
78. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Perils of Obama’s Latest Undeclared War,
ATLANTIC, (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/theperils-of-president-obamas-latest-undeclared-war/413566/
(“Obama
just
keeps
pretending that he isn’t quite waging war.”); Jack Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking
Expansion of a President’s Power to Make War, TIME, (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/ http://time.com/3326689/obamaisis-war-powers-bush/ [hereinafter Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion] (“The
President’s gambit is, at bottom, presidential unilateralism masquerading as implausible
statutory interpretation.”).
79. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001). Interestingly, President Obama chose to justify his military actions on statutory
grounds, in contrast to President George W. Bush’s aggressive assertions of Article II
authority. See Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority:
The Role of Courts in a Time of Constitutional Change, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 871, 871–73
(2007) (“It is no secret that the administration of President George W. Bush has
consistently asserted a breathtakingly broad view of the scope of executive authority
under Article II of the United States Constitution.”); Mary Louise Kelly, When the U.S.
Military Strikes, White House Points to a 2001 Measure, NPR (Sept. 6, 2016),
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organization, its strategy, theology, and goals differ substantially from al
Qaeda’s.80 ISIS did not even exist when Congress passed the AUMF.81 The
AUMF did not grant the President authority to wage war against all Islamic
terrorism in perpetuity.82 Moreover, Congress did not signal to President
Obama that it approved of his actions against ISIS.83 To this extent,
President Obama’s aggressive use of the military seemed an end run around
Congress and the War Powers Resolution of 1973.84
Furthermore, Congress did not retroactively approve Obama’s actions
(at least not while he was still in office).85 Though Lincoln was probably
incorrect when he asserted that the President possessed the suspension
power, Congress almost certainly would have suspended the writ at his
request, had it been able to convene.86 Indeed, Congress ultimately signaled
its assent by passing a statute permitting the President to suspend the writ.87
President Obama could point to no retroactive congressional approval of his
military actions against Qaddafi or ISIS.88
Nor did international law appear to give legal cover to the President’s

http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/09/06/492857888/when-the-u-s-militarystrikes-white-house-points-to-a-2001-measure.
80. See Ali Rod Khadem, Why Should Law and Policy Makers Understand
Extremist Beliefs? The Islamic State (ISIS) as a Case Study: Past, Present, and Future 31–
45 (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the political, tactical, and theological
differences between Al Qaeda and ISIS).
81. See id. at 23.
82. See Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (articulating the purpose as authorizing “the use of United States Armed
Forces against those responsible for the recent [9/11] attacks launched against the United
States”) (emphasis added); Deborah Pearlstein, Is It Legal? No., OPINIO JURIS, (Sept. 11,
2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/11/legal/; Jens David Ohlin, The 9/11 AUMF Does
Not Cover ISIS, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 11, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/11/911aumf-cover-isis/.
83. See Friedersdorf, supra note 78.
84. Some presidents, of course, have contested the constitutionality of features of
the War Powers Resolution. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV.
941, 1109 n.665 (2008).
85. See Frierdersdorf, supra note 78. One wonders whether members of Congress
may now approve similar actions taken by a different president. See infra note 151 and
accompanying text.
86. FARBER, supra note 15, at 158–61.
87. See id. at 159.
88. See Frierdersdorf, supra note 78.
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actions. For example, with regards to the bombing in Syria, there was no
United Nations Security Council resolution and no apparent claim that the
U.S. Government was acting in self-defense.89 Some commentators sought
to justify the action on humanitarian grounds.90 However, as Professor
Pearlstein argued at the time, the law did not clearly support such a theory,
and the U.S. Government’s behavior calls into serious question whether the
government genuinely acted for humanitarian reasons.91
At the same time, the President’s unilateral military actions in Libya
and against ISIS were not without precedent. In recent decades, U.S.
presidents have unilaterally initiated smaller wars in places like Grenada,
Panama, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti.92 Admittedly, some of these
interventions may be distinguishable on various grounds. For example, some
lasted fewer than 60 days and therefore would have fit within the War
Powers Resolution.93 Other interventions were arguably pursuant to treaty
obligations and therefore should be evaluated according to different legal
criteria.94
Nevertheless, the fact remains that U.S. presidents in recent decades
have repeatedly committed military force without congressional
authorization.95 This precedent should not mean that a president may always
act without constitutional constraint in the field of military affairs. Past
practices, however, matter to both historians and judges.96 President

89. See Deborah Pearlstein, Not Even the Brits Can Make the Case Bombing Syria
Is Lawful, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/08/30/even-britscan-make-case-bombing-syria-lawful/ [hereinafter Pearlstein, Not Even the Brits Can
Make the Case].
90. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Another Legal View of the Dissent Channel Cable
on Syria, JUST SECURITY (June 20, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/
31571/legal-view-dissent-channel-cable-syria/.
91. Pearlstein, Not Even the Brits Can Make the Case, supra note 89.
92. See SANFORD LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE
FEDERALIST IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 268 (2015) [hereinafter LEVINSON, AN
ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL]; Marty Lederman, Syria Insta-Symposium: Marty Lederman
Part I—The Constitution, the Charter, and Their Intersection, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 1,
2013),
http://opiniojuris.org/2013/09/01/syria-insta-symposium-marty-lederman-partconstitution-charter-intersection/.
93. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2012); Lederman, supra note 92.
94. See Lederman, supra note 92.
95. See Damrosch, supra note 71, at 1409.
96. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597–602
(1952).

2017]

Of Law and Legacies

967

Obama’s military interventions in Libya, Iraq, and Syria may be hard to
defend in terms of constitutional text, the War Powers Resolution, or
congressional action. Measured against his predecessors’ actions, however,
his interventions seem consistent with common executive practices in recent
decades.97 Moreover, Congress did not cut off military funding to prevent
President Obama’s interventions, suggesting some degree of legislative
acquiescence.98
Further complicating the analysis, Congress put President Obama in an
impossible situation. President Obama inherited difficult problems,
including ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and an unstable Middle East
region that soon erupted in widespread unrest and violence.99 Nevertheless,
few members of Congress were willing to engage seriously with these
dangers. Congress did not want to give the President the authority to fight
ISIS, but it also did not want to limit his authority either.100 Members of
Congress realized that each approach had serious downsides and that it was
politically more perilous to take a stand than not.101 Congress here didn’t so
much disagree with the President as punt the decision to him, knowing it
could criticize him for whatever he did.102
Past executive practice is a contextual factor that both historians and

97. See Lederman, supra note 92.
98. See Benjamin Wittes, The AUMF is Dead. Long Live the AUMF, LAWFARE

(Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/aumf-dead-long-live-aumf; see also Kate
Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1352 (1988) (noting that
appropriations “are not only legislative specifications of money amounts, but also
legislative specifications of the powers, activities, and purposes—what we may call,
simply, ‘objects’—for which the appropriated funds may be used”); Fred Kaplan, Empty
Threats, SLATE (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
war_stories/2015/02/congress_will_authorize_president_obama_s_war_on_isis_legislato
rs_don_t.html.
99. See, e.g., Scott Anderson, Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apart,
TIMES
MAG.
(Aug.
11,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/
N.Y.
interactive/2016/08/11/magazine/isis-middle-east-arab-spring-fractured-lands.html.
100. See Russell Berman, The War Against ISIS Will Go Undeclared, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-war-againstisis-will-go-undeclared/390618/.
101. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Neither Obama Nor Congress Seems Eager for a
Vote on Military Action in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/us/politics/in-washington-little-appetite-for-a-vote
-on-iraq.html.
102. See id.
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judges consider as part of the constitutional calculus.103 Congressional bad
faith, by contrast, is not. The legality of unilateral presidential action does
not turn on whether Congress has been cooperative.104
Historians, however, can take account of congressional behavior, and
this perspective shines new light on President Obama’s unilateralism.105
Admittedly, Obama, unlike Lincoln, did not confront challenges that
threatened the very existence of the nation.106 Nevertheless, the dangers he
confronted were serious, and historians evaluating the actions against ISIS
may offer President Obama more of a constitutional pass than lawyers
would. Congress’s political cowardice put the President in an impossible
position.107 The President himself made this very point, telling Congress,
“Guys, you can’t have it both ways here. . . . You can’t be ducking and
dodging and hiding under the table when it comes time to vote, and then
complain about the president not coming to you . . . .”108
As a legal matter, the President probably had it wrong; Congress can
have it both ways. Nothing requires Congress to bring questions of foreign
policy to a vote or to refrain from criticizing the president. While context
and past practices are part of the legal inquiry, a legalist analysis could
reasonably (though not necessarily) conclude that President Obama’s
unilateral military interventions exceeded his authority.109
Where the law is sometimes blind, though, historians can still take
notice. However much we lament the President’s failure to get congressional
approval, we must also recognize that he believed innocent people’s lives
103. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 597–602
(1952); FARBER, supra note 15, at 148–49.
104. Cf. Jack Goldsmith, Why the President Should Seek Congressional
Authorization for the Use of Force Against the Islamic State [UPDATE on War Powers
Resolution], LAWFARE (Aug. 22, 2014), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-presidentshould-seek-congressional-authorization-use-force-against-islamic-state-update-war.
105. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L.
REV. 773, 788–90.
106. See FARBER, supra note 15, at 14–15.
107. See Hirschfeld Davis, supra note 101. As Senator Tim Kaine put it, “This is not
about an imperial presidency. It’s about a Congress that’s reluctant to cast tough votes
on U.S. military action.” Id.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Obama’s Constitutional Legacy, WASH. POST (Jan. 19,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/19/obamas
-constitutional-legacy/?utm_term=.cd44b5dd7801.
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were at stake, national security was threatened, and Congress would not
engage.110 The President responded by doing what he thought was best for
the nation’s security and basic human rights.111 Historians assessing these
episodes will likely judge Congress harshly for refusing to engage with such
pressing matters. By comparison, President Obama, though imperfect, will
probably look much better.
B. Domestic Policy
On the domestic front, Obama also encountered congressional
obstruction. During the first two years of the Obama presidency, Congress
passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (a major
economic stimulus package),112 the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (a financial regulation statute),113 and the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (a major overhaul of the country’s
health care system).114 In 2010, however, Republicans gained back a Senate
seat to deprive the Democrats of their filibuster-proof majority.115 Later that
year, Republicans retook the House.116

110. See President Barak Obama, Remarks by the President on the Administration’s
Approach to Counterterrorism, (Dec. 6, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2016/12/06/remarks-president-administrations-approachcounterterrorism.
111. See id. See generally Oona A. Hathaway et al., Consent-Based Humanitarian
Intervention: Giving Sovereign Responsibility Back to the Sovereign, 46 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 499, 502–03 (2013) (offering consent-based intervention as a way to reconcile the
tension between sovereignty norms militating against humanitarian intervention
unauthorized by the U.N. Security Council and human rights proponents who believe
human rights norms should trump state sovereignty concerns).
112. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 123 Stat. 115.
113. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5301 (2012).
114. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012). The
ACA raised important constitutional questions. The Supreme Court upheld most of the
statute, though it held that the Medicaid expansion provision exceeded Congress’s
Spending Clause power, and the Court also indicated that the individual mandate
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588
(2012). This contribution focuses primarily on President Obama’s executive actions,
though legislation he championed, of course, will also be part of his constitutional legacy.
115. See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html?_r=0.
116. See Jeff Zeleny, G.O.P. Captures House, but Not Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03elect.html?pagewanted=all.
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From that point on, time and again, Congress refused to work with
President Obama on almost anything.117 As with foreign policy, the Obama
Administration responded to this legislative resistance by acting without
Congress when it could.118 The Environmental Protection Agency
promulgated several important regulations, such as the Clean Power Plan,
limiting power plants’ greenhouse gas pollution.119 Knowing that it lacked
the resources to deport all illegal immigrants, the Department of Homeland
Security implemented the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
and Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (DAPA) programs, establishing criteria for determining when
officials enforce immigration laws.120 And, of course, agencies, such as the
Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Health and Human
Services, helped implement the ACA.121 In short, President Obama pushed
significant policy decisions through administrative action without going
through Congress.
As a descriptive matter, there is nothing unusual about this. The
President’s policymaking power has increased through the generations, in
substantial part due to presidents’ increased directive authority over the
administrative state.122 President Obama’s critics accused him of usurping
Congress’s legislative role,123 but U.S. presidents, starting with President

117. See Jennifer Steinhauer, G.O.P. vs. Obama: Disrespect or Just Politics?, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/us/politics/02cong.html.
118. See Binyamin Applebaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive
Power, Obama Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/us/politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html.
119. See Robinson Meyer, How Obama Could Lose His Big Climate Case, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 29, 2016), theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/09/obama-clean-power-plan-dccircuit-legal/502115/.
120. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law
Redux, 125 YALE L.J. 104, 138–40 (2015).
121. See Adam Sonfield, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: Enrollment
Strategies and the U.S. Family Planning Effort, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 8, 2011),
https://www.guttmacher.org/gpr/2011/11/implementing-affordable-care-act-enrollmentstrategies-and-us-family-planning-effort.
122. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277–
319 (2001) (discussing the “sea change”—beginning during the Reagan Administration
and continuing during the Clinton Administration—that gave the President far more
policy influence over administrative agencies).
123. See, e.g., Elizabeth Slattery & Andrew Kloster, An Executive Unbound: The
Obama Administration’s Unilateral Actions, HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2014),
http://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/executive-unbound-the-obama-
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Reagan, have wielded very substantial domestic policymaking authority
through administrative agencies.124 Though in theory the President’s control
over independent agencies should be reduced because he can only remove
their leaders for cause (as opposed to executive agencies, whose leaders he
may fire at will), in practice, the President exerts significant power over most
administrative agencies.125 We might quibble with the legality and wisdom of
particular administrative actions, but it is simply wrong to suggest that
President Obama’s reliance on administrative agencies to further policy
goals was anomalous.
Thus, in most instances, the legal questions surrounding Obama’s
domestic executive actions implicated not constitutional law, but
administrative law and statutory interpretation.126 Did the agency act
properly given its statutory mandate? Did it employ proper administrative
procedures? Constitutional norms may inform those inquiries, but they are,
for the time being, primarily statutory and administrative ones.127
While Republicans accused President Obama of exceeding his
executive powers, Obama’s supporters responded that Congress was
historically inert during the Obama years, at least after 2010.128 The country
faced numerous difficulties, and Congress, despite the President’s pleas, did
nothing.129 Congressional Republicans seemed to follow a simple rule: if
President Obama favored something, they opposed it.130 As one reporter put
administrations-unilateral-actions.
124. See Kagan, supra note 122, at 2277 (explaining that President Reagan broke
from past presidential practices by “self-consciously and openly adopt[ing] strategies to
exert” influence over agency policy).
125. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 19, at 6.
126. See Garrett Epps, Obama Leaves the Constitution Weaker than He Found It,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/obamaleaves-the-constitution-weaker-than-he-found-it/512015/.
127. Should Justice Gorsuch and other Justices revive the nondelegation doctrine or
other doctrines challenging the legitimacy of the administrative state, these inquiries
could once again become constitutional. See generally Kevin Russell, Judge Gorsuch on
Separation of Powers and Federalism, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 15, 2017),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/judge-gorsuch-separation-powers-federalism/
(discussing then-Judge Gorsuch’s views on the administrative state).
128. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, Goodbye and Good Riddance, 112th Congress, WASH.
POST (Jan. 4, 2013), https://washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/04/goodbyeand-good-riddance-112th-congress/?utm_term=.7cc0b742F985.
129. See id.
130. See Michael Grunwald, The Victory of ‘No’, POLITICO MAG. (Dec. 4, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/republican-party-obstructionism-

972

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 65

it, the Republicans treated Obama “not just as a [P]resident from the
opposing party but an extreme threat to the American way of life.”131
President Obama’s willingness to resort to administrative regulation
needs to be understood in light of a Republican Congress whose raison
d’être was to see him fail. Of course, the Constitution’s requirement of
bicameralism and presentment makes legislation hard to pass in all events,132
and various congressional rules and practices make it still harder, even in
saner political times.133 But congressional paralysis during the Obama years
was especially acute.134
The legalist and historical analyses, thus, will likely diverge here, as
well. The law does not particularly care if the President took administrative
action because Congress refused to act. Administrative regulations must
stand or fall on their own legal merits. This is not to say that any particular
Obama-era regulation was illegal, but that the administrative law analysis
for assessing those regulations’ legality would not typically examine
congressional behavior.
Historians and members of society more generally, however, do care
about political motives, and their perceptions of those motives can color the
way they remember presidents and congresses.135 There are countless
differences between Lincoln’s and Nixon’s constitutional transgressions, but
motive was an important one. History has deemed Lincoln’s motives
disinterested and Nixon’s self-serving. A good deal of our country’s
collective historical consciousness about those two figures flows from those
assessments.136

victory-trump-214498.
131. Id.
132. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
133. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1441, 1442–43 (2008).
134. See, e.g., Phillip Bump, It’s a Holiday Miracle! The 113th Congress (Probably)
Wasn’t the Least Productive Ever!, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2014/12/19/its-a-holiday-miracle-the113th-probably-wasnt-the-least-productive-ever/?utm_term=.0d42e76a888a
(“The
113th was barely not the least productive Congress in recent history.”); Klein, supra note
128 (noting that the 112th Congress was unproductive compared to any other Congress
since 1948).
135. See, e.g., Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?, supra
note 47 at 1150–51.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 35–38.
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C. Constitutional Hardball and the Obama Legacy
How then will historians see the motives of President Obama and
Congress from 2010 to 2016? These judgments are difficult to make without
the benefit of some distance. That said, even at this early stage we can offer
some tentative reactions, and they do not shine a flattering light on Congress.
To be sure, President Obama’s inability to negotiate successfully with
Congress will surely inform his legacy. That said, congressional attitudes
towards President Obama will probably negatively impact those Congresses’
legacies more than the President’s.
Some of congressional Republicans’ obstruction can be chalked up to
genuine ideological differences with the President, but much of it was politics
at its worst.137 Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, indeed, announced
that his “number one priority is making sure President Obama’s a one-term
president.”138 Top Republican congressional leaders, including
Representatives Paul Ryan, Eric Cantor, and Kevin McCarthy, met the night
of President Obama’s inauguration to devise a plan to “mortally wound” the
President politically.139 Compromise was not part of congressional
Republicans’ game plan, committed as they were to what Professor Tushnet
has called “constitutional hardball.”140 Congress’s primary objective for the
last six years of the Obama presidency was to obstruct anything the President
wanted, even if workable compromises might have been available.141
137. I concede that observers who do not share my view of these Congresses will
most likely view President Obama’s tenure differently.
138. See Glenn Kessler, When Did McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama a
‘One-Term President’?, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/fact-checker/post/when-did-mcconnell-say-he-wanted-to-make-obama-a-oneterm-president/2012/09/24/79fd5cd8-0696-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html?utm_term
=.a1ee2a6520bc (attributing quote to an interview to the National Journal from Oct. 23,
2010).
139. See ROBERT DRAPER, DO NOT ASK WHAT GOOD WE DO: INSIDE THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES xv-xix (2012); Marshall, supra note 105, at 773.
140. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 523
(2004) (defining “constitutional hardball” as political practices that are “within the
bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some
tension with existing pre-constitutional understandings. . . . [because its practitioners]
believe the stakes of the political controversy their actions provoke are quite high, and
that their defeat and their opponents’ victory would be a serious, perhaps permanent
setback to the political positions they hold”).
141. See Joshua Green, Strict Obstructionist, ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/strict-obstructionist/
308344/.

974

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 65

For example, despite the ACA’s flaws, Republicans refused to work
with the President to improve the law.142 Some of this disagreement was
ideological, reflecting opposing visions of government’s proper role in
society.143 Much of it, though, was simply partisan politics.144 Though most
everybody agreed the ACA needed improvement, Congress refused even to
consider additional legislation to try to minimize its glitches.145 Republicans
in Congress preferred that the law operate as poorly as possible, even if
many Americans would suffer in the meantime.146 After all, an improvement
to the ACA might be a “win” for the President.147
At the time, many Republicans justified their behavior on the
ideological grounds that they opposed the ACA in its entirety.148 During the
early weeks of the Trump Administration, however, many of these same
politicians supported a bill that would have retained key ACA provisions,
such as the protection of dependent care until age 26, the pre-existingconditions policy, the essential-health-benefits requirement, and the
prohibitions on annual and lifetime limits.149 Admittedly, there were crucial
points of genuine philosophical disagreement, but future events help
demonstrate that many Republicans found some parts of the law acceptable.

142. See Zoë Carpenter, A Blueprint for the GOP’s Attempt to Sabotage Obamacare,
NATION (July 25, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/blueprint-gops-attemptsabotage-obamacare/.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Steven Waldman, The Obamacare Exchanges Are a Mess and It’s Not Really
Obama’s Fault, FORTUNE (Oct. 4, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/04/
obamacare-exchanges/ (explaining that in the last six years, there were no major fixes to
the ACA); Jeffrey Young, Congress Could Easily Fix a Huge Obamacare Problem. It
Won’t, HUFFPOST (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/05/
obamacare-lawsuits_n_5648871.html.
146. Waldman, supra note 145 (arguing that Republicans intentionally decided to
make Americans suffer to try to damage President Obama politically).
147. Admittedly, given sharp ideological disagreements, it would have been difficult
for Democrats and Republicans to agree on substantial revisions to the ACA. That said,
Republicans refused even to negotiate over revisions, deciding that they wanted
Americans to suffer from the law’s flaws so that they could blame Democrats rather than
make improvements that could potentially increase the ACA’s popularity. See id.
148. See id.
149. See Haeyoun Park & Margot Sanger-Katz, The Parts of Obamacare
Republicans Will Keep, Change or Discard, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2017/03/06/us/politics/republican-obamacare-replacement.html.
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Republicans’ refusal to work with the President was hardly limited to
health care. Congress similarly refused to address other problems facing the
nation, neglecting even routine obligations such as passing a budget and
raising the debt ceiling.150 Whereas Republicans during the Obama years
professed to be appalled at the level of governmental debt, some of those
same politicians seemed more willing to raise the debt ceiling and avoid
defaulting on the country’s debts once their own party regained the White
House in 2017.151
The Republicans’ bad faith was also evident in the field of foreign
affairs. For example, when President Obama requested congressional
authorization to respond with force to President Assad’s chemical weapons
attack in Syria, most Republicans opposed such permission.152 Prominent
congressional Republicans such as Mitch McConnell, Marco Rubio, Paul
Ryan, and Mac Thornberry all opposed President Obama’s plan to respond
with force.153 All four reversed course and supported President Trump’s
decision to use unilateral military force responding to Assad’s chemical
attack a few years later.154 To be fair, some Republicans such as Rand Paul
opposed intervention in both instances, and others, such as John McCain and
Lindsey Graham, contended on both occasions that military strikes should
be part of a broader overall strategy.155 But many Republicans
opportunistically and hypocritically opposed President Obama at every turn,
seemingly without consideration of the merits of the issue.

150. See Jonathan Weisman, House G.O.P. Raises Stakes in Debt-Ceiling Fight, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/us/politics/house-gopleaders-list-conditions-for-raising-debt-ceiling.html; Jonathan Weisman & Jeremy W.
Peters, Government Shuts Down in Budget Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/us/politics/congress-shutdown-debate.html.
151. See, e.g., Bess Levin, Surprise: Republicans No Longer Care About the Debt
Ceiling, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/
03/surprise-republicans-no-longer-care-about-the-debt-ceiling;
Damian
Paletta,
McConnell Says There Is ‘Zero Chance’ Congress Will Fail to Raise Debt Ceiling, WASH.
POST (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/
08/21/mcconnell-says-zero-chance-congress-will-fail-to-raise-debt-ceiling/?utm_term
=.3a177d2ed017.
152. See Alicia Parlapiano, Where Top Lawmakers Stand on Syria: Now and in 2013,
TIMES
(Apr.
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/
N.Y.
04/07/us/politics/congress-quotes-on-syria-airstrikes.html.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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D. Legal and General Legacies
I concede that some informed observers might view these events
differently. For the purposes of this symposium contribution, my primary
concern is not where to place the moral and political blame (though I
obviously have my views), but the various factors that help shape a
president’s legacy. The example of Lincoln suggests that constitutional
violations shape a president’s legacy less than some lawyers might care to
think.156 President Lincoln, to be sure, confronted not just political
dysfunction but civil war, so we should be careful not to generalize too much
from his example. But other presidents also have committed constitutional
violations without much apparent damage to their historical reputations.
President Thomas Jefferson, for instance, completed the Louisiana
Purchase, and his presidency is generally well regarded, though he himself
believed the transaction to be unconstitutional.157 The Supreme Court
invalidated President Harry Truman’s seizure of the steel mills,158 but
Truman ranks highly on many historians’ lists.159 Depending on the context,
we are sometimes willing to forgive constitutional transgressions, even when
judges, rather than pundits, have pronounced the deeds unconstitutional.160
Different critics will characterize the actions of President Obama and
his Republican adversaries differently, and it is well beyond the scope of this
symposium contribution to attempt a definitive account of the era’s political
skirmishes. For the sake of argument, though, let’s hypothesize that many
congressional Republicans during the Obama years played constitutional
hardball with particularly unscrupulous bad faith.161 How should this
assessment of congressional motives affect our view of President Obama’s
constitutional legacy?
Congress’s bad faith does not alter the legalist analysis. For better or
worse, a central principle of our Constitution is that it should be difficult for
government to act, so congressional obstruction does not license the

156. See supra Part II.
157. See Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?, supra note

47, at 1149–50; see Presidential Historians Survey 2017, supra note 44.
158. See Youngstown Sheet & Tubing Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
159. See Presidential Historians Survey 2017, supra note 44.
160. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589.
161. See Marshall, supra note 105, at 773 (noting that President Obama faced “one
of the most obstructionist Congresses in American history”); Tushnet, supra note 140, at
523.
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President to act instead.162 Judges reviewing military or (more likely)
administrative actions usually do not consider whether Congress is playing
nice.
These legal lines matter less to historians, who enjoy the luxury of
considering events through multiple lenses. With this in mind, I suspect
historians writing this period won’t dwell too long on the constitutionality of
Obama’s actions. To be sure, President Obama made some constitutionally
questionable decisions.163 His drone strike program, in particular, was
troubling, because the Administration was less than fully transparent about
the criteria it used to target the lives of specific individuals.164
For the most part, though, President Obama’s constitutional actions
were well within the range established by his predecessors. Perhaps
particular administrative actions were illegal on statutory or administrative
grounds, but, as noted above, President Obama’s reliance on the
administrative state was hardly unusual.165 Similarly, Obama’s willingness to
use military force without congressional authorization fits within
established, albeit controversial, precedents, and they addressed a fast162. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 29 (2006)
[hereinafter LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION] (“[M]ore than one
representative and senator has accompanied retirement from Congress with comments
about their own frustration at the difficulty of actually getting anything done . . . .”).
Whether this constitutional feature serves our country well is an entirely different
question. See id. at 29–32 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of bicameralism).
163. See supra Part III.
164. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION AGAINST
A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN
ASSOCIATED FORCE, http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_
White_Paper.pdf (“[T]he threat posed by al-Qa’ida and its associated forces demands a
broader concept of imminence.”); Spencer Ackerman, Obama Claims US Drone Strikes
(July
1,
2016),
Have
Killed
Up
to
116
Civilians,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/01/obama-drones-strikes-civilian-deaths
(quoting Humans Rights First as saying that the information released did not provide
enough data); Deborah Pearlstein, Re-Engaging on an ISIL AUMF, OPINIO JURIS (Sept.
22, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/09/22/re-engaging-on-an-isil-aumf/ (“[T]he secrecy
surrounding U.S. drone operations for most of the Administration contributed to the
problem, making it almost impossible for the people to perform any meaningful check
on executive uses of force abroad . . . .”); The Editorial Board, Transparency in the Drone
TIMES
(Mar.
19,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/
Wars,
N.Y.
20/opinion/sunday/transparency-in-the-drone-wars.html (stating what information
should have been given for transparency).
165. See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
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changing terrorist threat.166 Even the drone strike program, though relying
on new technology, is arguably not dramatically different from past covert
military actions.167
Phrased somewhat differently, while President Obama certainly used
his office aggressively, he followed a well-tread path. As Professor
Skowronek has put it, the Presidency is an office “that regularly reaches
beyond itself to assert control over others, . . . one whose normal activities
and operations alter system boundaries and recast political possibilities.”168
The Obama presidency was surely consequential from a variety of
perspectives, but Obama’s use of the powers vested in his office was mostly
unremarkable. Of course, reasonable people can lament the vast powers that
accrue to the president in our constitutional system, but that is a question
that transcends any particular president’s legacy.169
From that perspective, President Obama’s legacy does not have strong
constitutional implications. More or less, he stayed the course established by
his predecessors. Not all presidencies are constitutionally transformative. As
Professor Whittington argues, “Few presidents have the desire or authority
to challenge inherited constitutional and ideological norms and attempt to
construct a new political regime. Far more common are affiliated leaders,
who rise to power within an assumed framework of goals, possibilities, and
resources.”170
Moreover, even if we accept that some of President Obama’s actions
exceeded constitutional boundaries, it is far from clear that that legal story
would bury his legacy more generally.171 To the contrary, the historian would
likely note the President’s accomplishments despite difficult challenges and

166. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text.
167. For example, efforts to try to assassinate foreign leaders or to overthrow foreign

governments are arguably roughly analogous. See, e.g., Daniel L. Byman, Why Drones
Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice, BROOKINGS (June 17, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-drones-work-the-case-for-washingtonsweapon-of-choice/. The argument is not that these actions are legally (or morally)
unproblematic, but rather that President Obama does not appear to have ventured into
radically new constitutional territory. See id. Moreover, to the extent that precise drone
strikes, at least in theory, can kill dangerous terrorists with minimal damage to innocent
civilians and U.S. troops, there are serious policy arguments in their favor.
168. SKOWRONEK, supra note 43, at 4.
169. See infra Part V.
170. WHITTINGTON, supra note 5, at 23.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 56–77.
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a bitter opposition that wasn’t willing to work with him on anything. To this
extent, the lead story from 2010 to 2016 may be Congress’s profound
intransigence rather than the Administration’s reliance on administrative
agencies.172 Similarly, while history may judge some of Obama’s military
interventions less kindly, in this sphere, too, it must recognize that Congress
took no constructive steps to address serious situations.
My objective here is not to be an apologist for President Obama, whose
legacy does include some unfortunate blemishes.173 Rather, it is to point out
that the court of history often eschews legal analysis, especially when there
are plausible legal arguments on either side. However historians come down
on Obama’s constitutional legacy, they will write the era differently than
lawyers would.
IV. ENTER PRESIDENT TRUMP
The x factor for President Obama’s legacy—and for the future of our
country—is his successor, President Trump. How will the Trump White
House’s own constitutional legacy color historians’ views of President
Obama? Presidents are remembered in part by whom they succeeded and
172. See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
173. For example, President Obama insisted that the Assad regime would cross a

“red line” if it used chemical weapons and then failed to act when Assad crossed that
line. Greg Jaffe, The Problem with Obama’s Account of the Syrian Red-Line Incident,
POST
(Oct.
4,
2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postWASH.
politics/wp/2016/10/4/the-problem-with-obamas-account-of-the-Syrian-red-lineincident/?utm_term=.7702141c3602. But see Derek Chollet, Obama’s Red Line,
Revisited, POLITICO MAG. (July 19, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016
/07/obama-syria-foreign-policy-red-line-revisited-214059 (arguing that Obama’s
handling of this situation “accomplished everything it set out to do”). Obama himself
acknowledged mistakes in his handling of the Libya situation. See Dominic Tierney, The
(Apr.
15,
2016),
Legacy
of
Obama’s
‘Worst
Mistake’,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/
478461/. Even fans of the ACA would acknowledge that the initial rollout of the
exchanges was haphazard and unprofessional. See, e.g., Tom Cohen, Rough Obamacare
Rollout: 4 Reasons Why, CNN (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/22/
politics/obamacare-website-four-reasons/index.html. President Obama also did not take
meaningful steps to address the role of money in politics (though admittedly judicial
precedent limited his options here). See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST? 191–
92, 280–81 (2012). Finally, President Obama’s aggressive crackdown on national security
whistleblowers and leakers likely harmed both governmental transparency and free
speech norms. See Eyal Press, Obama Leaves Trump a Mixed Legacy on WhistleYORKER
(Dec.
7,
2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/
Blowers,
NEW
news/daily-comment/obama-leaves-trump-a-mixed-legacy-on-whistle-blowers.
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preceded. Lincoln’s legacy, for instance, is likely enhanced in part by
Andrew Johnson’s disastrous presidency and the vague sense that
Reconstruction might have turned out differently somehow had Lincoln
presided over it.174 There is, no doubt, a loony sort of hindsight bias to this;
Lincoln (obviously) was dead when Johnson was President, so it seems odd
to judge him by events and decisions over which he had no control. But we
make sense of events and public figures by comparing them to other things
we know, and historians glean insights by comparing presidents within the
same era.175
Only half a year into the Trump Administration, it is too early to make
any definitive assessments, but the early months suggest he does not take the
rule of law seriously. President Trump’s decision to fire FBI Director James
Comey, who was investigating possible collusion between the Trump
presidential campaign and Russia, appears to be an obstruction of justice
reflecting disregard for the rule of law and important governmental
institutions.176 Even if Trump himself did not collude with the Kremlin, his
action interfering with an ongoing investigation eliminated vital institutional
checks within the Executive Branch.177 Similarly, President Trump’s refusal
to divest his assets to mitigate potential conflicts of interest indicates that he
will put his personal interests above legal norms.178 Indeed, Trump’s
apparent willingness to accept benefits from foreign governments, such as
payments from governments whose officials stay in his hotels, creates an
avoidable Emoluments Clause issue.179
More generally, President Trump seems utterly ignorant of and
indifferent to the law. The President’s open disdain of judges who rule
174. See FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, supra note 25, at 184.
175. See SKOWRONEK, supra note 43, at 8 (“Certainly it is no accident that the

presidents most widely celebrated for their mastery of American politics have been
immediately preceded by presidents generally judged politically incompetent.”).
176. See David Cole, Trump’s Constitutional Crisis, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 10,
2017), www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/05/10/trumps-constitutional-crisis-James-Comey.
177. See id.
178. See Elizabeth Drew, Trump: The Presidency in Peril, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June
22, 2017), www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/06/22/trump-presidency-in-peril.
179. See Norman L. Eisen et al., The Emoluments Clause: Its Text, Meaning, and
Application to Donald J. Trump 16, 18–21, GOVERNANCE STUDIES BROOKINGS (DEC.
16,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/gs_121616_
emoluments-clause1.pdf. Admittedly, there is no precedent fleshing out the Emoluments
Clause, but there are certainly colorable arguments that President Trump is violating the
Clause. See id.
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against him suggests he sees constitutional conflict not as an opportunity to
articulate a constitutional vision, but as a political stage on which to flex his
muscles and denigrate anyone who stands in his way.180 It is not simply that
Trump does not know much about the Constitution; it is that he seems proud
of his ignorance and uninterested in the constitutional rules and standards
that define his own power.181 Time will shed more light on whether Trump is
truly lawless or merely obnoxious, but the early months of his
Administration suggest a man whose knowledge of and respect for the
Constitution are remarkably low for a U.S. president.
Will President Obama seem constitutionally scrupulous by
comparison, or, as Professor Somin argues, should he be blamed for
transgressions that left President Trump with a “loaded gun?”182 It is too
early to answer this question definitively, but I find the “loaded gun” theory
overblown. For one, most of the constitutional questions arising so far during
the Trump presidency largely have nothing to do with President Obama’s
example. Furthermore, even if President Trump were to follow Obama’s
aggressive use of the administrative state, for instance, the reliance on
administrative agencies is hardly a phenomenon tied to one predecessor.
Presidents had progressively augmented the Executive’s authority long
before Obama took office.183 President Obama may have contributed to this
phenomenon, but the office he took over was already a very powerful one.184
If Trump found a loaded gun in the Oval Office, it was a gift from decades
of predecessors, not just one.185
Additionally, even if President Obama sometimes exceeded
constitutional limits, he never lost sight of the Constitution. When the
180. See Kristine Phillips, All the Times Trump Personally Attacked Judges—and
Why His Tirades Are ‘Worse than Wrong’, WASH. POST (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/26/all-the-times-trumppersonally-attacked-judges-and-why-his-tirades-are-worse-than-wrong/?utm_term
=.f0cd5ca56256.
181. See Sanford Levinson & Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of AntiPublian Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order,
CHAPMAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028725.
182. Somin, supra note 109.
183. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 19, at 5–7 (discussing the tremendous power
of the U.S. President over the vast federal bureaucracy); Kagan, supra note 122, at 2246
(“We live today in an era of presidential administration.”).
184. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 19, at 5–7.
185. Contra Somin, supra note 109.
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Obama Administration took controversial constitutional actions, it sought
to justify them with the language of the law.186 The legal arguments may
sometimes have been unconvincing (especially to political opponents), but
the Administration offered serious constitutional explanations for its
actions.187
The contrast with the Trump Administration is stark. If President
Trump does not disdain the law, he certainly gives the appearance of doing
so. Obama was no Lincoln, but Trump may well be another Nixon—that is,
a president determined to abuse his office to enhance his own power and
insulate himself from legal consequences. This is, after all, a man reportedly
looking into using the pardon power to pardon not only his family members,
but also himself.188 It is still early in his Administration, and, perhaps in
hindsight, President Trump will not look so bad. So far, however, Trump
seems to view the law as a political weapon or a pesky technicality.189
President Obama, by comparison, was constitutionally devout.
V. CONSIDERING CONSTITUTIONAL DYSFUNCTION
The more important question may be not how history will judge
President Obama after the Trump years, but how it will judge the
Constitution. It is no secret that the country and Congress are bitterly
divided along party lines.190 These deep divisions make it very difficult for
Congress to act, leaving most policymaking in the hands of the executive
branch.191

186. See, e.g., REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS GUIDING THE
UNITED STATES USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY
OPERATIONS (Dec. 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
framework.Report_Final.pdf.
187. See, e.g., id. at ii (issuing report “to enhance the public’s understanding of the
legal and policy principles that have guided U.S. national security operations”).
188. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Yes, Trump Can Legally Pardon Himself or His
Family. No, He Shouldn’t, WASH. POST (July 21, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/outlook/yes-trump-can-legally-pardon-himself-or-his-family-no-he-shouldnt/
2017/07/21/6134fb12-6e2d-11e7-b9e2-2056e768a7e5_story.html?utm_term
=.bf98f8ccdd4c.
189. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
190. See Political Polarization in the American Public: How Increasing Ideological
Uniformity and Partisan Antipathy Affect Politics, Compromise and Everyday Life, PEW
RES. CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.people-press.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization
-in-the-american-public/.
191. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 19, at 11 (noting that the Executive
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If your party controls the White House, this may not seem like such a
bad thing, but this arrangement deprives the country of democratic
deliberation about many important policy issues. It also results in policies
more easily changed by future administrations, as new regulations can
supplant old ones, generally without congressional input. Of course,
administrative procedures like notice-and-comment rulemaking are arduous
and time-consuming,192 but, at least in theory, each new administration can
roll back the previous administration’s accomplishments without engaging
democratically elected legislators.193 The result is not coherent, long-term
policy, but rather a series of policy reversals as the presidency flips between
political parties.
The Constitution does not explicitly confer this policymaking power on
the President, but in practice, all the checks and balances that make it
difficult for Congress to act funnel such discretion to the President.194 This
phenomenon should force us all to ask whether our Constitution is
functioning well. The Framers wanted to foster deliberation and check
legislative excess,195 but instead legislators frequently abdicate their
policymaking responsibilities altogether. Presidents, thus, enjoy great de
jure power and even greater de facto power.196 To the extent many find this
phenomenon troubling,197 we should admit it is a problem that far transcends
any one president.198
Branch drives policymaking in the United States).
192. See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of
the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 278 (2010).
193. See Kagan, supra note 122, at 2347 (noting that Congress “cannot often marshal
the resources necessary to overturn administrative actions backed by” the President).
194. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 19, at 5–7, 11 (describing the Executive’s
tremendous power).
195. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”:
The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L. J. 449,
489 (1991) (discussing Bowsher v. Synar and INS v. Chadha).
196. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 19, at 11.
197. Professor Daryl Levinson argues that this narrow focus on the power of the
presidency (and related questions of structural constitutional law) centers too much on
government institutions at the expense of “the coalitions of policy-seeking political
actors—comprising officials, voters, parties, politicians, interest groups, and other
democratic-level actors—that compete for control of these government institutions and
direct their decisionmaking.” Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public
Law, 130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 40 (2016).
198. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV.
683, 726 (2016) (“[P]residential control over the regulatory state is here to stay. It has
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This acknowledgement need not imply the illegitimacy of the
administrative state writ large. I, for one, generally support the legitimacy of
administrative agencies, but nevertheless consider it problematic when most
federal policymaking happens outside Congress.199 Regardless of our
political views, we should all ask if the Constitution is working properly
when Congress is so impotent.
The Obama years also raise other questions about the Constitution. If
historians ultimately do not judge President Obama’s constitutional
transgressions too harshly, what would that assessment tell us about our
nation’s fundamental law? The fact that Presidents Jefferson, Lincoln, and
Truman (and others), despite apparent constitutional violations, rate highly
suggests that constitutional law sometimes, perhaps even usually, gives way
to political reality. Given these examples, why should we care about the
legalist analysis—at least where we don’t have an actual case pending in
court?200
One answer might be that law does matter, but only when its
requirements are clear. On this view, because the Constitution is underdeterminate, presidents have substantial leeway to push the Constitution’s
boundaries so long as they do not clearly violate it.201 Some of President
Obama’s actions were constitutionally questionable, but plausible legal
arguments could still be made in their favor. Similarly, President Lincoln was
able to offer plausible, if contestable, constitutional justifications for most of
his actions.202 This may suggest that the historical and legalist legacies are
interconnected. Were a president to violate the Constitution blatantly, the
historian (like the judge) will so rule. But where the president’s actions are
within the range of plausibility, the historian will more likely turn to
nonlegalist factors.
become woven into the fabric of the regulatory state, and it occurs regardless of the
political party in the White House.”).
199. See Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law
Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2101–02 (2011).
200. See Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?, supra note
47, at 1149–51.
201. See Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-onexecutive-powers-let-obama-bypass-congress.html?pagewanted=all.
202. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, (1862) (upholding legality of Union
blockades); Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?, supra note
47, at 1140 (suggesting, but not endorsing, constitutional arguments in favor of
Emancipation Proclamation’s applicability to Confederate states but not border states).
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There may be some truth to this hypothesis, but there is also more to
it. Society mostly evaluates presidents’ legacies by nonlegalist criteria.203 We
condemn Nixon and praise Lincoln not because Lincoln’s constitutional
transgressions were “closer” legal questions, but because we consider
Nixon’s goals corrupt and Lincoln’s righteous.204 Put differently, most people
care more about normative concerns than legalist analysis.
Norms, after all, are the foundation for public support. Nixon’s
corruption lost him public support, including from his own party.205 When
his public support evaporated, Nixon’s legal violations suddenly mattered a
great deal.206 By contrast, though Lincoln and Obama both went through
periods of unpopularity, both maintained enough public support to protect
them enough from widespread charges of illegality. On this account, popular
opinion matters more than formal legal analysis, at least for presidents.
It also matters which constitutional provisions and values are in play.
Constitutional provisions are not all created equal, at least not in the public’s
eye. The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that President Obama had
improperly made recess appointments to the National Labor Relations
Board,207 but outside the legal community, it is unlikely this decision will
much affect the Obama legacy. The issue simply lacks the political or moral
salience to play a large role in shaping society’s broader assessment of the
Obama presidency,208 especially given that Obama merely followed the

203. See Levinson, Was the Emancipation Proclamation Constitutional?, supra note
47, at 1150.
204. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text.
205. See The Damaging Legacy of Nixon and Watergate, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 7, 2014),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-nixon-watergate-resign-0807jm-20140807-story.html (discussing Nixon’s resignation as being motivated by his
recognition that he had lost public support and would likely be impeached).
206. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Rep. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., arts. I–V
(1974).
207. See Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014). Though
the Justices all agreed these recess appointments were invalid, they disagreed
strenuously on the reasoning.
208. See generally MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS 9–11 (1999) (contrasting the “thin” Constitution, which represents the
document’s “fundamental guarantees of equality, freedom of expression, and liberty”
and which are central to Americans’ national identity, and the “thick” Constitution,
which details “how government is to be organized”).
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example of past presidents.209 To be sure, the recess-appointments issue is
connected to the broader, crucial issue of executive power, and legal scholars
could fairly claim that President Obama ought not to have expanded the
presidency’s already vast powers.210 For many members of the public,
however, seemingly technical questions involving little known constitutional
provisions like the Recess Appointments Clause likely lack the political
salience to count much towards the President’s legacy one way or another.
If there are truths in these hypotheses, we should ask whether society
cares less about the Constitution writ large than it professes. Americans
purport to revere the Constitution as our nation’s civic religion,211 but they
often disagree about what it means and discount evidence militating against
their preferred view.212 At the end of the day, people value their own beliefs
more than abstract constitutional principles.213 We give Lincoln a
constitutional pass because we admire his values and accomplishments.
Notwithstanding our sworn fealty to the higher cause of the Constitution, we
often insist that our civic religion must fit our values rather than the other
way around.214
Perhaps these attitudes, however suppressed, reflect a constitutional
vision that is surprisingly closer to the British constitution, which embodies
the accumulated wisdom acquired through generations of government.215 As
Professor James Randall once explained, the U.S. Constitution, like the
British, “is a matter of growth, development, and interpretation.”216
Originalists may contest this characterization as a normative matter, but, as
a descriptive one, it is hard to dispute that the nation has molded the
Constitution to fit its needs through different eras.217 To this extent, our
attitudes towards past presidents’ constitutional missteps may reflect an
unstated recognition that constitutional norms change, that some of those

209. See Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2560 (“Presidents have made recess appointments
since the beginning of the Republic.”).
210. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 105, at 792.
211. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 10–11, 17 (1988).
212. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 67, at 729.
213. See RANDALL, supra note 11, at 2 (“Laws and constitutions have importance
not in themselves, but because of the social purposes which they embody.”).
214. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 67, at 726.
215. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
216. RANDALL, supra note 11, at 5.
217. See generally 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 2: TRANSFORMATIONS
(1998); RANDALL, supra note 11, at 5.
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norms are more important than others, and that there are higher presidential
virtues than constitutional adherence.218
In more recent years, we should also ask whether we care less about
legalist analysis because we recognize that the Constitution is not working
as well as we like to think it is. This attitude may be implicit in our national
discourse, but it is rarely explicit.219 To be sure, some scholars, most notably
Professor Sandy Levinson, have emphasized the Constitution’s serious
defects.220 Levinson, in fact, has called for a new constitutional convention.221
The mainstream public, however, still says it loves its Constitution.222
If we dig a little deeper, however, we find an unstated, yet palpable
discomfort with the Constitution. Most Americans today agree that
contemporary politics, certainly at the national stage, are dysfunctional.223
Calls for a constitutional convention are growing more frequent and not just
within the professoriate.224 While some (mostly conservative) critics claim
they merely want to restore the document’s true meaning,225 the implicit
acknowledgement is that today’s constitutional framework is not serving us
well.
The political dysfunction underlying those calls to reform was

218. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2006)
(“Social movements change the ways Americans understand the Constitution.”).
219. See Miguel Schor, The Federalist as a Primer on Constitutional Design: A
Critical Appraisal of Separation of Powers and Written Constitutionalism (July 24, 2017)
19–21 (unpublished manuscript at 19–21) (on file with author) [hereinafter Schor, The
Federalist].
220. See, e.g., LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at
11; Miguel Schor, Constitutional Dialogue and Judicial Supremacy 21–23 (forthcoming
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1730202; Schor, The
Federalist, supra note 219, at 27.
221. See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS
AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 391–92 (2012).
222. See Berger, Rhetoric, supra note 67, at 726.
223. Public Says Dysfunctional Government Is Nation’s Top Problem, PEW RES.
CTR. (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/10/10/public-saysdysfunctional-government-is-nations-top-problem/.
224. See, e.g., Ashley Balcerzak, The Constitutional Convention 2016?, SLATE (Jan.
26, 2016), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/01/_liberals
_and_conservatives_are_teaming_up_to_call_a_new_constitutional.html.
225. See, e.g., Republican Platform: A Rebirth of Constitutional Government, GOP,
https://gop.com/platform/we-the-people/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2017).
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especially acute during the Obama years,226 and whether or not a new
convention is the proper remedy, the Constitution deserves some of the
blame.227 Our system not only makes it very hard to pass legislation, but it
also encourages extremism.228 Various interrelated phenomena such as
partisan gerrymandering, political primaries, and winner-take-all voting
districts have pushed House representatives to either end of the political
spectrum.229
Of these phenomena, gerrymandering is probably the most
objectionable as it effectively allows representatives to select their electors,
rather than the other way around.230 The Constitution alone does not create
this phenomenon, but it tolerates it.231 As a result, new district lines protect
incumbents, and Representatives can speak to their bases without worrying
about other portions of the electorate.232 Indeed, many Representatives are
at far greater risk of losing in a primary to a fellow party member pandering
to the base, rather than in the general election to an opponent from the other
party.233 Given this environment, most House members have little incentive
to cooperate across the aisle, thus further contributing to ideological
extremism.234

226. Public Says Dysfunctional Government is Nation’s Top Problem, supra note

224.
227. See generally LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 162,
at 25–27.
228. See id. at 28–29.
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Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 588 (1993).
231. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (upholding partisan gerrymandering
against constitutional challenge). The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in a
case that will give it the opportunity to revisit this issue. See Gill v. Whitford, 137 S. Ct.
2289 (June 19, 2017) (staying lower court judgment “pending disposition of the appeal
in this Court”).
232. See ALAN WOLFE, DOES AMERICAN DEMOCRACY STILL WORK? 52–56 (2006).
233. See How Can Republicans Be Both Safer and More Numerous?, ECONOMIST
(Oct.
3,
2013),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/10/
gerrymandering.
234. See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 46 (2012); Christopher Ingraham, A Stunning Visualization of
Our Divided Congress, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2015/04/23/a-stunning-visualization-of-our-divided-congress/?utm_term
=.04e14d71ef62.
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The Constitution erects a different kind of districting in the Senate.235
As a result, Senator Mitch McConnell could brazenly admit that his political
goal was to ruin the Obama presidency and know that it would probably help
him in Kentucky.236 Likewise, Senate Republicans could refuse even to grant
a hearing to Chief Judge Merrick Garland, an eminently qualified and fairminded Supreme Court nominee, and find that their tactic worked.237 By
giving disproportionate political power to smaller states, the Constitution
creates further potential for democratic minorities to thwart the will of the
majority.238 Along similar lines, the Electoral College disproportionately
weighs smaller states so that Donald Trump could win the 2016 election
despite losing the popular vote by about 3 million votes.239
Critics of the contemporary Republican Party must accept that our
electoral structures in 2016 richly rewarded the Republicans’ behavior.
Indeed, what appears to be “bad faith hardball” to some is shrewd political
strategy to others.240 The Republicans’ vitriolic opposition to President
Obama seemed beyond the pale to many observers.241 However, just as
constitutional structures encouraged and permitted Republicans to obstruct
Obama’s agenda, so too did they help the GOP claim victory in 2016. Of
course numerous factors contributed to these outcomes, but constitutional
structures were among them.
How then do we assess the success of a Constitution that rewards
politicians who relentlessly seek to sabotage their opponents? Similarly, how
do we assess a political system that pushes most major policy decisions into
a complex web of administrative bureaucracy far beyond the attention and

235. See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 49–51.
236. See LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN to ALL, supra note 92, at 195.
237. See Ariane de Vogue, How McConnell Won, and Obama Lost, the Merrick

Garland Fight, CNN POL. (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/09/politics/
merrick-garland-supreme-court/index.html.
238. See Adam Liptak, Smaller States Find Outsize Clout Growing in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/11/us/politics/democracytested.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Liptak, Smaller States].
239. See LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION, supra note 162, at 81–93
(critiquing our “dreadful” system for electing the President); Gregory Krieg, It’s Official:
Clinton Swamps Trump in Popular Vote, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-popular-votefinal-count/index.html.
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241. See supra note 131 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Grunwald, supra note 130.
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understanding of most ordinary citizens?242 And how do we assess a
constitutional system in which presidents can repeatedly take unilateral
military action without any meaningful check?243
One common answer has been that we must endure the Constitution’s
inefficiencies to stave off authoritarianism. But legislative inefficiency and
gridlock have worsened, and the executive branch’s power has grown.244
Now we have a President whom many fear has authoritarian impulses.245
Perhaps these fears are overblown, but, if they are not, this is where the
Constitution must prove its worth. We may tolerate governmental
dysfunction if we know that it is the price we pay to keep despotism in check.
In reality, though, by funneling so much power to the Executive Branch, the
Constitution might enable, rather than prevent, despotism. What if the
Constitution creates dysfunction and fails to check authoritarianism?
This question is hardly academic. The traditional view is that public
institutions and popular opinion check presidential ambitions.246 Trump has
already demonstrated his disdain for institutions, for instance, by firing an
FBI Director conducting an investigation the President deemed
threatening.247 Perhaps other public institutions can check the President, but
as this piece goes to press, it is unclear whether or how they will.
It’s also unclear whether popular opinion today offers a meaningful
check. Though Trump’s approval ratings are historically low for a new
242. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 19, at 11–12.
243. To the extent many military decisions occur mostly in secret, even public

opinion cannot offer much check. Cf. Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative
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exempting administrative agencies from administrative law and “grey holes” providing
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pleases”).
244. Dana Nelson, The Growth of Executive Power Has Turned Politics into War,
WASH. POST (Mar. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/
03/08/the-growth-of-executive-power-has-turned-politics-into-war/?utm_term=
.b4c581e95985.
245. See, e.g., David Frum, How to Build an Autocracy, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/how-to-build-an-autocracy/
513872/; The Times Editorial Board, Trump’s Authoritarian Vision, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4,
2017), http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-ed-trumps-authoritarian-vision/.
246. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 32–33 (2010) (discussing the president’s relationship with the
“polity” and “a vast bureaucratic machine”).
247. See supra Part IV.
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president,248 he can claim that he won the election (albeit not the popular
vote) and therefore enjoys a popular mandate to carry out his agenda. While
opposition to Trump is high, there remains a significant segment of the
population that approves of him or at least strongly prefers him to any
alternative from the Democratic Party. This segment of the population will
likely give President Trump a long leash, and the President knows it.
Similarly, while Trump’s behavior clearly makes congressional Republicans
nervous, for at least the time being, they know they must stay on good terms
with him to advance their own legislative goals. Perhaps Trump will someday
cross some line to alienate fellow Republicans, but opponents should not
hold their breath. After all, most Republicans have stuck with Trump so far.
These are good reasons for pessimism, but it is important to remember
that just because the Constitution has contributed to these problems does
not mean that it is a failure. Our institutions have not functioned well in
recent years, but the Constitution’s shortcomings are only one reason.
Contemporary cultural phenomena—such as intensely fought culture wars,
surging populism, a viciously partisan media, easily exploited social media,
uninformed voters, and voter clumping—play substantial roles as well.249
Before turning to a new constitutional convention, we would also be
wise to remember that it has endured for well over two centuries, and the
nation, for all its problems, has prospered. Admittedly, the Constitution
bears substantial blame for the Civil War that almost destroyed the Union,
but the fact remains that our constitutional democracy has been more stable
for longer than most. To the extent we still have some meaningful checks on
governmental power, they exist in large part because Americans accept the
legitimacy of the Constitution that imposes those limitations. Any new
system would have to earn that presumptive respect, and the early years
would be uncertain. Furthermore, it is not clear that alternative structures
are better; all governmental systems contain their own problematic
pathologies.250
Perhaps most importantly, in our poisoned political climate we would
248. See Karen Yourish & Paul Murray, President Trump’s 100 Days of Record-Low
Approval Ratings, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/02/28/us/politics/the-highs-and-lows-of-trumps-approval.html.
249. See generally SUSAN HERBST, RUDE DEMOCRACY: CIVILITY AND INCIVILITY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 22–26 (2010); KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON & JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA,
ECHO CHAMBER: RUSH LIMBAUGH AND THE CONSERVATIVE MEDIA ESTABLISHMENT
191–205 (2008); WOLFE, supra note 232, at 4–13, 24–25.
250. See Akhil Reed Amar & Sanford Levinson, What Do We Talk About When We
Talk About the Constitution?, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1132 (2013).
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have a very difficult time agreeing on something better. Article V provides
no guidance about the ground rules for a constitutional convention, so
political parties and figures would each try to use the process to game the
system in their favor. Such political wrangling would be more likely to
further inflame partisan animosities than to produce thoughtful
improvements to the Constitution.
Indeed, given that a constitutional convention would have high stakes
and no clear initial procedural rules, the “losers” of such a gathering may
well seek to deepen the nation’s discord. One highly educated friend of mine
told me that he would “take up arms” if a new constitutional convention
agreed to abandon equal representation in the Senate. There are, of course,
serious arguments both for and against the Senate as currently constituted.
The evident rage this and other constitutional issues can provoke, however,
should caution us against a convention that could add even more fuel to the
nation’s already-partisan fires.
Nevertheless, while a constitutional convention today would be a bad
idea, we do need to have a serious national conversation about our
Constitution and failing political system. Instead of mindlessly declaring
their devotion to the Constitution, Americans should have candid
discussions about how it serves us well and how it fails us. Instead of
conveniently blaming political opponents for all our ills, Americans should
ask how institutional structures and incentives contribute to the problem—
and what citizens and various public actors can do to improve things, short
of scrapping the Constitution altogether.251
The Obama and Trump Administrations share little in common, but
both should force us to ask these questions. Indeed, if there is a lasting
constitutional legacy from the Obama presidency, perhaps it should be
newfound attention to the Constitution’s shortcomings. These are not the
Republic’s finest days, but if we can use today’s difficulties to address such
fundamental issues, some good might come out of them yet.
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original)).

